Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

Ogden City v. Public Service Commission of Utah
et al : Brief of Plaintiff
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Thatcher; Jack A. Richards; Charles H. Sneddon; Attorneys for Plaintiff;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ogden City v. Public Service Comm. Of Utah, No. 7884 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1800

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I

I

~
Case No. 7884

IN THE SUPREME COURT

FILE 0

of the

STATE OF UTAHSEP 2 4 i952
----------------

Clerk, Supreme Court, l ~tab

OGDEN CITY, a 1\funicipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, a body politic and MOUNTAIN
STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
PAUL THATCHER
First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
JACK A. RICHARDS
CHARLES H. SNEDDON
Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services
and Technology
by the Utah State Library.
:I~O.woon
'"'""'" Act,
co.. administered
o•ou.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

u'""

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATE~IENT

Page
OF FACrrs ________________________________________________ 1

STATEMENT OF POINTS --------···------------················-······ 8
ARGUMENT -·-· -------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
Point 1. The Commission unlawfully imposed
upon the protesting city, rather than upon
the applicant company, the burden of proof
in the pro~eeding below._______________________________________________ 9

Point 2. There is no evidence to support the findings of the Commission to the effect that the
present practice of treating the franchise fees
as a general expense of the company results
in some discrimination against non-city subscribers in the applicable rates and charges
for telephone service ----------------------------------------------------14
Point 3. There is no evidence to support the finding of the Commission to the effect that the
Company's customers outside the cities (including Ogden City) contribute a part of the
franchise fees and special taxes, while receiving little or no direct benefit therefrom __________________ 36

Point 4. The finding of the Commission, to the
effect that there is no evidence that the City's
franchise contract was entered into with the
!r,
intent that the funds to pay the city for the
rights thereby acquired by the Company would
come from the general income of the Company, is contrary to all of the competent evidence in the proceeding, and contrary to law....... .44
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Point 5. The order of the Commission impairs
the obligation of the Company's franchise
contract with the City and its inhabitants in
violation of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1
of the Constitution of the United States, and
Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of
Utah ---------------------------------------------------------------------·------------50
Point 6. The Order of the Commission, by authorizing a specific and arbitrary set off, releases and extinguishes, at least in part, the
indebtedness, liability, and obligation of the
Company to the City under its franchise
contract, in violation of Article VI, Sections
27 and 29, of the Constitution of Utah......................58
Point 7. The Order of the Commission is void and
beyond the powers of the Commission granted
hy the legislature, and is a void attempt to
exercise power to supervise and interfere with
municipal money and property and to levy
municipal taxes and perform municipal functions, which powers the legislature cannot
validly grant the Commission under Article
VI, Section 29 and Article XII, Section 8, of
the Constitution of Utah.·-----------------------------------------···60
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,/

Page
Point S.

The Order of the Commission by its

terms and in effect unlawfully transforms a
lawful and proper franchise fee exacted from
the Company into an unlawful purchase or
use tax on telephone service by the user thereof, in violation of Article VI, Section 29,
Article XI, Section 5 (a), and Article XIII,
Section 5, of the Constitution of Utah ______________________ 62
CONCLUSION --·-------------------------------------------------------------------72
AUTHORITIES CITED

Court Decisions
Atlantic City Sewerage vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners 26 A. 2nd 71, aff'd. 29 A.
2nd 850 (N.J.L.) --------------------------------------------------------------11
Birmingham Electric vs. Alabama Public Service
Commission 47 So. 2nd 455, (Ala.)------------------------------11
City of Columbus vs. Public Utilities Commission
(Ohio, 1921) 133 N. E. 800, syllabi 26 to 31. _______________ 56
City of Elmhurst vs. Western United Gas Company (Ill. 1936) 1 N. E. 2nd 144__________________ 29, 35, 68, 72
Idaho Power Company vs. Thompson 19 Fed. 2nd
547, 580 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------61
Logan City vs. Public Utilities Commission 72
Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961. .. ---------------------------------------------------62
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company vs. Public. Service Commission 105 Utah
230, 142 Pac.. 2nd 873; Rehearing denied
105 Utah 266, 271; 145 Pac. 2nd 790
792 ----------------------,---------------------------------10, 13, 29, 32, 33, 35
New York Edison Company vs. Maltbie 279 N.Y.S.
949 -------------- ·-------------------------------------------------------------------------11
Chortino vs. Salt Lake and U. R. Co. 52 Utah
4 76, 488, 174 Pac.. 860____________ ------------------ ·-------------------------38
State vs. Department of Public Service (Washington, 1943) 142 Pac. 2nd 498, 532, 536, Syllabi
44-45 ------------------------------------------------29, 36, 50, 66-7, 68, 71
State vs. Publie Service Commission 245 SW 2nd
851 (Mo., 1952) --------------------------------------------------24-29, 68-9
State Ex rel Seattle vs. Department of Public
Utilities 207 Pac. 2nd 712 (Wash., 1949) ____________ 69, 70-71
St. George vs. Puhlie Utilities Commission 62
Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720______________________________________________________ 59
Tucker vs. Brown 92 Pac. 2nd 221. ___________________________________ 70
Tucker vs. Brown 150 Pac. 2nd 604, 622 ........ __________________ 70
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Tulsa Tribune Company

YS.

Oklahoma Natural

Gas Company :361 Pac. 213 (Okl.) ................................11
Utah Light and Traction Company vs. Public
Service Commission 101 Utah 99, 118 Pac. 2nd
683, 689 ············-----------··············-········································37
Union Pac. R. Company vs. Public Service Commission 103 Utah 186, 134 Pac. 2nd 469 (Syllabi
7, 8 and 9) ···--------------·-················-·-·················-······39, 56, 61
Western Securities Co., vs. Spiro 62 Utah 623,
221 Pac. 856 Syllabus 5....................................................53

Legal Encyclopedias Cited
23 Am. Jur. "Franchises" SS2 to 8, pp. 714 to
720 ------··-···-····-·-···········-·-·-·········--·-····--·~---······-·····----------------37
43 Am. Jur. "Pub. Util." Sec. 83, p. 624-5 ........................ 58
16 C.J.S. pp. 344, note 61; 339, Note 14(3) and
342, Note 41 ·-··········--·-·············--···-·····-··-----------·-······--···--·--56
17 C.J.S. Page 744............................................................... .48
17 C.J.S. Page 755.----·······-···············-··········--------------------------.49
17 C.J.S. Page 782-----------------------------------····--------------------····.49
18 C.J.S. ''Corporations'' Section 6, Pages 376377 ··-·-···-···-·······-·····--·--···-··---····-·--····----·····-··························53
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
37 C.J.S. "Franchises" SS 1 to 14 Pages 141 to
158 -------------·-····---------------------------------------------------------------------38
37 C.J.S. Page 166, Note 95 _______________________________________________ .48
37 C.J.S. Page 167, Note L------------------------------------------------.48
37 C.J.S. Page 167, Notes 7 to 9________________________________________.48
62 C.J .S. Pages 68-69 ------------------------------------··--······--·····-----54

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions
Constitution of the United Statesa Article I, Sec.tion 10, Clause L------------------------------------·----------------------9, 50
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 18................ 9, 50
Constitution of Utah, Article VI, Section 27 .............. 9, 58
Constitution of Utah, Article VI, Section
29 --------------------------·--------------------9, 39, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 66
Constitution of Utah, Article XI, Section 5................55, 57
Constitution of Utah, Article XI, Section 5(a) .... 9, 62, 66
Constitution of Utah, Article XII,
Section 8 ----------------------------------------------------9, 38, 55, 56, 60
Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 5...... 9, 62, 66
Section 15-8-13 U.C.A. 1943................................................ 39
Section 15-8-14 U.C.A. 1943................................................38
Section 76-4-4 U.C.A. 1943 ..............................................5, 10
Section 76-4-24(2) U.C.A. 1943 .......................................... 2
Section 76-6-12(1) U.C.A. 1943 ...................................... 7, 10
Council-Manager Charter of Ogden City........................ 57
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN CITY, a :Municipal Corporation,
Plaint.iff,
-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, a body politic and MOUNTAIN
ST.A.TE'S TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CO:JIP ANY, a corporation,
Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action by Ogden City to obtain a review
of an order of the defendant Public Service Commission
authorizing the defendant Mountain States Telephon(?
and Telegraph Company (hereinafter sometimes called
the "Company") to make effective its "Second Revised
Sheet 5 of its Utah Intrastate General Exchange Tariff,
Section 20, 'General Regulations,' '' filed with the Commission under date of December 19, 1951. (Record 34).
That order was granted upon the application (R 1-3)
of the Company and over the protest (R. 136-139; 38-45)
of the City.
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-,
The so-called "Tariff" which was thus approved by
the Commission, so far as pertinent, reads as follows:

"1. Rate schedules of the Telephone Company, in Utah, do not include any portion of any
sales, excise, franchise, or occupation tax, costs
of furnishing service without charge, or similar
taxes or impositions presently or that may hereafter be levied by the F'ederal Government, the
State of Utah, or any political subdivision or taxing authority.
"2. Insofar as practicable, any such taxes,
levies impositions or charges presently or herehereafter levied may be billed by the Company
to its exchange customers on a prorata basis, with
the amount thereof added to the bill for service
to the Company's subscribers in the area wherein
such taxes, impositions or other charges are or
shall be levied against the Telephone Company."
(R. 3 and 25).
For a clear understanding of the situation it is necessary at this point toturn back to the time when the Company's franchise to use the City's streets was negotiated
and granted, and to consider some other facts in the
background.
The franchise in question was negotiated and granted in 1941 to run for a period of 25 years, or until1966.
(R. 125-127; Exhibits 3 and 4, R. 21 and 22, admitted R.
152-3). It must be presumed that this franchise contract
was submitted to and approved by the Commission before
it was accepted and executed by the Company as provided in Section 8 of the franchise ordinance, as required by Section 76-4-24 (2) U.C.A.
2
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By that franchise the City granted the Con1pany
the right to use its streets for pole lines, cables, etc.
In consideration thereof the Company agreed to pay the
City annually an amount equal to 1% of the local exchange revenues derived from telephones in Ogden City
and to provide the City certain so-called "free service"
during the term of the franchise. (Ibid., and R. 125-6).

In those negotiations it was understood by the Company's representative that the City Commissioners who
represented the City acted in a representative capacity
for the citizens and inhabitants of Ogden, so that the
inhabitants were in effect the real parties in interest. (R.
127).
The Company's representative (R. 125) recognized
that the franchise tax (or fee) is imposed upon the Company and not directly upon its customers (as in the case
of excise and sales taxes) although the money to pay all
taxes and other obligations must in the last analysis be
found in the ·consideration paid for services furnished
by the Company. (R. 127-129).
Until the present time all municipal franchise fees
and taxes always have been absorbed in the general expense of the Company. (R. 1; 100; 110; 118; 140; 26).
They were, with the exception of an increase in the
Salt Lake City tax, included in the oveerall expenses of
the Company in the fixing of the presently existing
rates of the Company in the Commission's case No.
3596, in which the Order was issued on August 10, 1951.
(R. 100; 110; 26; 118).

3
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A number of the cities and towns in the state have
imposed or exacted sales taxes, excise taxes, franchise
fees, occupational taxes and/ or free services from the
Company. (R. 110-115; Exhibit 2). The Company, or at
least its Utah Manager, Mr. 'Sawyer, regards all these
taxes and free services as essentially the same (R. 109),
a legal position with which the City cannot agree.
Except in the case of the franchise fee paid and free
services rendered Ogden City for the use of its streets,
the nature of these taxes was never specified, and the
Record is silent as to whether or not the sums paid other
municipalities were franchise fees in the nature of rental
for the special use and occupation of City streets (as in
Ogden's case) or occupational or license taxes imposed on
the Company's and other businesses or on the Company's
business alone for purely revenue purposes, or were sales
taxes on the sale of the Company's services, or excise
taxes imposed on some other phase of the Company's
business activities.
At any rate the amount of the taxes, and the percentage which the amount bears to the gross revenues of
the Company varies from city to city. Currently the
Ogden franchise fee is 1% plus free services amounting,
on the basis of current revenues, to .44 of 1% of the gross
receipts from local exchange revenues derived from telephones within the city limits. (R. 115, Exhibit 2; 125).
The transfer of the burden of all these charges and
free services to, and the recovery of the amount of the
tax and the retail value of the free services from local
consumers within the municipalities involved will result
in an increase in the Company's net earnings from 5.26%
to 5.4 7% of capital invested, or an increase of .21% of
4
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net earnings after taxes. (R. 118-119).
The exi~ting telephone rate schedules group towns
by size, according to the number of telephones on the
exchange, and a rate is fixed for telephones in each group,
upon the assmnption that the value of a telephone to a
subscriber varies directly with the nwnber of phones
which can be reached therefron1 without toll charge. (R.
129-130). However, it is noteworthy in this case that
geographically the boundaries of the urban base rate, or
"city ser·rice" area does not follow the city limits; there
are subscribers outside the city limits who get urban
service and pay the regular urban charge, without any
premium.
Moreover, neither the applicant Compa;ny nor OJnJYone else presented any evidence whatsoever proving or
tending to prove that the rates, based on the historical
practice approved in the general rate case just last year,
were in any way "unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or
preferential, or in anywise in violation of any provisions
of law" as is required by Section 76-4-4, U.CA. before the
Commission may act. On the contrary, the Company's
only witness testified on cross examination that he "could
not say" as to whether or not the rural lines "pay their
way" upon the rates in an equal proportion to the city
or base rate areas, that the Company did not attempt
to define its operations that fine on an exchange, but
develops an over-all cost to furnish service in a particular exchange area, and does not break down the cost of
furnishing service in the rural as cornpared to the city.
(R. 134-135).
Again (R. 1±3), the witness Mr. Sawyer testified
that it might be true that in a given exchange that the

5
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Company actually has to operate at a loss ; that the Company doesn't attempt to define areas around the state or
within exchanges where the cost of operation might be
in excess of the rates.
And again, he testified that he had no figures to
submit as to what proportion of the earnings come from
the several exchanges, or whether they are bearilng their
fair share in the overall picture. (R. 149-150; Emphasis
added).
It is, of course, admitted that in the Ogden area (as
an example) every phone call from the rural area, and
from the urban base area outside the city limits must
travel through the Ogden Exchange and along the city
streets pursuant to the franchise granted by the City. To
that extent every subscriber from outside the city limits
uses and directly benefits from the franchise. On the
other hand not every call from a city phone travels over
a country road; calls between city subscribers travel
only over city streets, and there is no automatic compensating use of country roads. (R. 133). This obvious
discrimination is enhanced by the fact that the city taxpayer pays ad valorem taxes to maintain the country
roads.
.
The existing discrimination, if any, is against the
city and in favor of the rural subscriber, instead of vioe
versa, as was assumed by the Company and the Commission.
Although the counties of the State (except Washington County) are all furnished similar free services, no
proposal or order was made to bill the cost of these to the
telephone users in the several areas involved. (R. 121;
25; 34).

6
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Upon the filing of the Company's application, the
Commission, pursuant to Section 76-6-12 (1), U.C.A., suspended the operation of the proposed Second Revised
Sheet 5, and entered upon an investigation of the matter
without formal pleadings, and held the hearing at which
the evidence disclosed the facts as above outlined.
Upon the closing of the hearing the Commission
made its Report, Findings and Order approving the proposed recovery of all franchise fees and license taxes,
so far as practicable, from subscribers within the respective municipalities. (R. 24-37). It apparently found as
a fact in substance that the present practice of treating
the franchise fees and license taxes as a general expense
of the Company resulted in "some discrimination" against
non-city subscribers in the applicable rates and charges
for telephone service, and that the practice should be
discontinued. (R. 28-29; 31). It also found that customers
living outside the cities contribute a part of the cost of
these taxes and impositions, while receiving little or no
direct benefit therefrom. (R. 29).
The Commission further found that the City's contention that its franchise contract was entered into with
the intent that the funds to pay the city for the rights
acquired by the Company would come from the general
income of the Company is not supported by the evidence,
and that the application of the proposed tariff would not
affect the City's constitutional rights, or impair its contracts. ( R 33)
A petition for rehearing was filed with the Commis-
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sian, setting out in detail the points to be hereinafter
argued. The petition was denied, and the City thereupon
brought this action to obtain a review of the Commission's proceedings.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Commission unlawfully imposed upon the
protesting city, rather than upon the applicant company, the burden of proof in the preceeding below.
2. There is no evidence to support the findings of
the Commission to the effect that the present practice
of treating the franchise fees as a general expense of
the company results in some discrimination against noncity subscribers in the applicable rates and charges for
telephone service.
3. There is no evidence to support the finding of
the Commission to the effect that the Company's customers outside the cities (including Ogden City) contribute a part of the franchise fees and the special taxes,
while receiving little or no direct benefit therefrom.
4. The finding of the Commission, to the effect
that there is no evidence that the City's franchise contract
was entered into with the intent that the funds to pay
the city for the rights thereby acquired by the Company
would come from the general income of the Company,
is contrary to all of the competent evidence in the proceeding, and contrary to law.
5.

The Order of the Commission impairs the obliga-
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tion of the Company's franchise contract with the City
and its inhabitants in violation of Article I, Section 10,
Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United 'States, and of
Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah.
6. The Order of the Commission, by authorizing
a specific and arbitrary set off, releases and extinguishes,
at least in part, the indebtedness, liability, and obligation of the Company to the City under its franchise contract, in violation of Article VI, Sections 27 and 29, of
the Constitution of Utah.

7. The Order of the Commission is void and beyond the powers of the Commission granted by the legislature, and is a void attempt to exercise power to supervise and interfere with municipal money and property
and to levy municipal taxes and perform municipal functions, which powers the legislature cannot validly grant
the Commission under Article VI, Section 29 and Article
XII, Section 8, of the Constitution of Utah.
8. The Order of the Commission by its terms and
in effect unlawfully transforms a lawful and proper
franchise fee exacted from the Company into an unlawful
sales, purchase or use tax on the user of telephone service, in violation of Article VI, Section 29, Article XI,
Section 5(a), and Article XIII, Section 5, of the Constitution of Utah.
ARGUMENT

POINT I. The Commission wnlawfully imposed upon the protesting city, rather than upon the applicarnt
company, the burden of proof in the proceeding below.
9
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It is conceded that the proposal to charge the franchise fees to the telephone using inhabitants of the cities
involved will result in an increase in cost of telephone
service to the inhabitants, and an increase in net income
to the Company. Under these circumstances and under
the provisions of Section 76-6-12{1), U.C.A., 1943, pursuant to which the proceeding was held (R. 4), the alteration in the established practice cannot be made "except
upon a showing before the Commission and a finding
by the Commission that such increase is justified."
Furthermore, under the provisions of Section 76-44(1), U.C.A., 1943, relating to the powers of the Commission to regulate rates, regulations, practices, etc., of
utilities, the Commission has no power to order or authorize a change in a rate or practice unless substantial
evidence is first presented to prove, and the Commission
finds, that the existing rates or practices are inherently
"unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential,"
or in some way in violation of some law.
In the case of
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company vs. Public Service Commission
105 Utah 230, 142 Pac. 2nd 873; Rehearing denied 105 Utah 266, 271; 145 Pac.
2nd 790, 792,
this court held that an order requiring intrastate rates
to be reduced to the level of intrastate rates is invalid
unless based on evidence "calculated to show that existing intrastate rates were inherently unreasonable." Obviously there is no presumption that existing rates or

10
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practices are unreasonable; the proponents of a proposed
change nn1st prove that as a fad. In the absence of such
evidence there i::; obviously a presun1ption that existing
practices are reasonable and non-discriminatory. This is
especially true where, as here, the Commission, on August 10, 1951, less than seven (7) 1nonths before, had found
and determined in its case No. 3596, that the existing
practices were fair and reasonable, as required by law.
(R. 26).
This is the rule elsewhere. In the case of
Birmingham Electric vs. Alabama Public
Service Commission, 47 So. 2d 455, (Ala.)
it was held that in a statutory proceeding wherein the
utility attempts to designate an increased rate which becomes effective unless suspended by the Commission, the
burden of establishing the basis for the increase is on the
utility.

And in
Tulsa Tribune Company vs. Oklahoma Natural Gas Company, 261 Pac. 213 ( Okl.)
the court held that the burden rests on one seeking to establish special rates to show that the rates set by the
Corporation Commission are unjust and unreasonable.
See also
Atlantic City Sewerage vs. Board of Public
Utility Commissioners, 26 A. 2d 71, aff'd.
29 A. 2nd 850 (N.J.L.)
and
New York Edison Company vs. Maltbie, 279
N.Y.S.. 949.
In this case the burden of proof was on the company

11
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to establish (1) that the existing practice of including
franchise fees in the Company's over-all costs was unreasonable, unjust and discriminatory, and to establish
(2) that the proposed change would correct that discrimination.
Both the Company and the Commission assumed,
without any evidence to support them, that both of these
facts were true in February, although not true in the
preceding August. The Commission argued in its "Report and Findings" (R. 28-29) that "Because of the Nature of these license, occupation, and franchise taxes and
the manner in which the Company has spread the expense. . . . to all of the telephone users of the state, it
becomes apparent that some discrimination results ..."
(Emphasis added.) However, as disclosed by the Record,
surrunarized in the Statement of Facts, and hereinafter
more fully discussed, there was nothing presented to
show the extent of such discrimination, or whether such
discrimination was, in the over-all picture, against or in
favor of the inhabitants of Ogden City or of any other
municipality. The Company's witness just had no figures
to present. There was presented absolutely no basis
for compa.rison.
The making of the order in favor of the proponent
Company under these circumstances is obviously tantamount to presuming the existence of these basic facts and
placing the burden on the protestant city to disprove their
existence. This, as has been shown, is contrary to law.
The position erroneously, and perhaps unconscious-
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adJuitted that the corporation and its officers in this case
acted for and represented its inhabitants who are the
real parties in interest, and under the American rule,
the third party beneficiary is recognized as the legal
obligee. Second, no n1atter who is recognized as the
obligee, the obligation of the Company is impaired. The
City is entitled to look to its original obligor, and cannot
be compelled to accept a novation with new obligors who
will, as the Commission anticipates, immediately bring
pressure and agitate for the cancellation of the obligation. Third, it is the established law of this state, and
elsewhere, that "a corporate entity may be entirely disregarded in order to reach and protect the real parties
in interest, and to disclose the real transaction."
Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah
623, 221 Pac. 856, Syllabus 5.

See also
18 C.J.S. "Corporations," section 6, pp. 376377,
where it is said that:

"It is clear that a corporation is in fact a
collection of individuals, and that the idea of the
corporation as a legal entity or person apart from
its members is a mere fiction of the law introduced for convenience in conducting the business
in this privileged way. It is now well settled, as
a general doctrine, that, when this fiction is urged
to an intent not within its reason and purpose,
it should be disregarded and the corporation considered as an aggregation of persons, both in
equity and at law.... The courts will disregard
the corporate fiction whenever its retention would
53
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produce injustices and inequitable consequence~-"
See also
62 C.J.S., pp. 68-69,
where it is said 'that a municipal corporation may, and
frequently does act as agent for its citizens, and is regarded as a trustee for its inhabitants.
If ever there was a case where the corporate entity
should be disregarded in the interests of justice, this is
that case. The inhabitants of Ogden stand in grave danger of being unjustly deprived of the fruits of their grant
of franchise privileges by the subterfuge of paying
through their corporation, with their money, a debt beneficially owned by them. The corporate entity of their
municipal corporation must not be permitted to stand
between them and justice.
The Company's obligation to the City's inhabitants
is impaired by the Commission's order.
As to the second objection raised by the Company
to this point, we readily concede that it is a general rule
that Municipal Corporations cannot claim, as against the
state, the protection of the "impairment of obligations"
clauses. There are two clear replies by way of which
the City avoids this admitted rule.
The first has already been suggested. The real
parties in interest here are the individual telephone-using
inhabitants of Ogden, in whose behalf the City here appears. They are under no such disability, and it seems
possible, from the clamor here, that the members of the
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ly, taken by the

Commi~sion

on this question of burden
of proof i~ well indicated by its statement in its Report
and Findings (R.30) that "The protestant, Ogden City,
sought. among other things, to show that there is discrimination in rate~ c.onstn1ced on a state-wide basis .
. . ." (Emphasis added.) On the contrary, Ogden City
did not seek to show, or asswne the burden of showing
anything. It sought only to require the Company to assume its proper legal burden of showing that present
state-wide rates are unreasonable and discriminatory
as claimed by the Company and that, as further claimed
by the Company, its proposed new tariff would cure
the same.
This case IS in principle identical with Mowntain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company vs. Public
Service Commission, supra. There the Commission, without supporting evidence, preswned that "there was no
reasonable basis for any difference" between interstate
and intrastate rates. This court struck down the order
based on that preswnption. In this case the Commission,
without supporting evidence, preswned,
(1)

that the Company's payment of the various
municipal occupation taxes and franchise fees
creates a difference in the burden of telephone
rates;

(2)

that such difference discriminates against the
rate-payer outside the municipalities in question;

(3)

that the difference and discrimination is exactly
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equal to the amount of the tax; and
(4)

that there is no reasonable basis for the presumed difference,

thus piling one unjustified presumption on another. The
order based on these presumptions also should be struck
down.
As we will demonstrate below, there is no evidence
whatsoever in the record to support any one of these
bold assumptions made by the applicant Company and
the acquiescent Commission.
The indulging of this presumption in effect places
the burden on the City to disprove a fact which the Company had the burden of proving. This is contrary to law.
The Commission's order should be vacated because of
this vital legal error.
It should perhaps be added here that, while the Commission's findings are so informally phrased and so argumentative that it is difficult to ascertain therefrom
just what facts are found, it seems apparent that the
Commission has nowhere attempted to find that the discrimination it presumed to exist is without reasonable
basis. If so, then there is no finding (with or without evidence) to support the order, as is required by law and
the decision of this court abo;ve cited, and the order
cannot stand.
POINT 2. There is no evidence to support the findings of the Commission to· the effect that the presoot
practice of treating the franchise fe.es as a general ex-
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pense of the company results in some discrimination
against non-city subscribers in the applicable rates arnd
charges for telephone service.
Throughout the hearing before the Commission the
Company and its sole witness apparently assumed that
the payment of varying franchise fees, as well as the
payment of other taxes mentioned, as general expenses
of the Company resulted in discrimination against the
users of telephones outside the limits of the cities who
are paid for the use of their public streets in the Company's private business, or for the privilege of doing
business therein. The Commission, obviously anxious
to approve the application, which had apparently been
made at the instigation of one or more members of the
Commission (R.101), fell into the s·ame error.

But there is no evidence in the record to p·rove that
assumption as a fact.
There are only two ways in which the Company
could have proved such discrimination, or proved, as
required by law, that existing rates and practices are
"unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential:"
(1)

It could produce evidence to show that the
Commission erred in its order of August 10,
1951, approving the existing rate structure,
including the practice of absorbing the fees
and taxes in question in its total operation,
as general expenses; or

(2)

It could prove a change in circumstances occurring since the previous hearing which for
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the first time rendered the existing practice
unjust, unreasonable discriminatory or preferential.
The Company of course was foreclosed by the doctrine of res adjudicata from a collateral attack here on the
Commission's 1951 General Rate Order, and hence it
could not legally follow the first ·alternative. It did not
attempt to do so, but, on the contrary it conceded, in
effect, that until recently the established practice of treating these taxes as general operating expense had an insignific~nt effect. See Counsel's opening statement (R.
100), and the testimony of the sole witness (R. 116-7).
The Company therefore attempted the second
method, and produced evidence of a recent increase (from
1% to 2%) in the tax or fee paid to Salt Lake City, plus
testimony that the Company was "informed" that several
cities were considering proposals which, "if adopted,"
would further increase these expenses. Finally, the Company's Exhibit 2 (R. 17-20) showed that the amount
of these "special taxes" ·as the Company chooses to call
them, varies from nothing in a number of small cities to
.39% of local 0xchange gross receipts in Midvale, to
1.44% in Ogden, to 2% in Salt Lake City, and to an
isolated and insignificant high of 7.28% in tiny Schofield. That was all. (R. 117; 125; 140-141). One curious
thing about the Company's position on this point is that
according to counsel's opening statement (which he
read from a p"'.'epared script) the Company in 1951 paid
$149,000 in occupation taxes, franchise fees, free service,
etc. (R. 100), but notwithstanding the increase referred
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to the estimate for 1952 was only $1~-!,623. (Exhibit 2,
R. 17: R. 111 and 115). The fig11res don't show the
increase the Company claimed.
However that nmy be, this evidence certainly does
not prove that existing rates produce any unl'awful or
unreasonable discrin1ination against non-taxing or nonfranchise communities.
Let us consider the various assumptions in which the
defendants in this case (the proponents below) indulged
themseh·es in the proceeding under review.

First, it was assumed that payment of the fees, taxes,
etc., out of the general funds of the Company creates a
difference in the burden of telephone rates. But there is
absolutely no proof as to what these rates are, either
in or out of the communities involved, except that the
rates vary from community to community, the vari·ation
being by groups, according to the number of telephones
in the exchange. (R 129). These rates were established,
after hearing, on .August 10, 1951, and all city franchise
fees and license taxes then existing were considered at
that time. (R. 125). These included the Ogden City 1%
franchise fee and its "free service" rendered as street
rental. These ~ncluded all such charges now existing
except half of Salt Lake City's present 2% charge. .As
the Commission is presumed in law to do its legal duty
(at least until the contrary is shown) it must be presumed that the rate schedules so fixed did not impose
an unfair and discriminatory burden on rate payers
outside of Ogden, Logan, Provo and other franchise
or taxing cities, even though these charges were in-
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eluded arnd ha;n,dled as a general expense.
There is absolutely no evidence to show that these
rates did not in fact, with due allowance for the type
of service rendered, distribute the burden equally among
all rate payers, not only for variations in these charges,
but also for variations in labor costs, in office rentals,
in local levies of ad valorem taxes, and in the c·ost of
transporting equipment to serve the communities, and
so on through all the multitudinous cost factors of a
telephone serv!ce.
Of course, it would not only strain, but would rupture credulity for us to ask the court to believe that every
phone user in the state now bears exactly his fair share
of the Company's various costs, and we do not do so.
On the contrary, we believe that susbtantial inequalities
exist, but that in fact they discriminate against, rather
than in favor of the rate payers in Ogden City and, in
gener'al, in her sister municipalities who have franchise
agreements with, or levy occupational taxes on, the Company.
Our point is that the burden is on the Company to
prove the claimed difference in burden as a basis for its
proposed change in pr~actice and charge,s, and there is no
evidence in the record either as to the actual or comparative rates paid by, or the cost burden and capital investment properly to be alloeated to, the customers in and!
out of the communities involved. Until there is prepared a study showing separately for each area involved
the amount of capital investment and the ~amount of op-
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eration costs fairly to be allocated to each area, on the
one hand, and the amount of revenue derived from each
area, on the other hand, there is no possible basis for
comparison, or for judging- which, if any, are bearing
an unjust share of the burden to the benefit of another.

Second, it was assumed that the (assumed) difference in burden discriminates against the rate payer
outside the municipalities in question. Here again there
is a complete absence of evidence to support the assumption; indeed, when considered in the light of matters
of general knowledge, and of which the court will take
judicial knowledge, the only evidence available all tends
to prove that presently it is the telephone users in Ogdoo
and her sister cities who suffer from discrimilnation iJn
phone rates.
Let us consider the evidence before the Commission.
The existing rates classify the exchanges according
to the number of telephones served, and uniform rates
are established for all the towns within each group
or class. The rates vary from group to group. Within
each group the rates vary with the class of service,
whether urban-commercial or urban-residential 1, 2 or
4 party line, or rural multi-party line servi·ce. (R. 129130). Furthermore, some subscribers outside the city
limits, but apparently close thereto, get urbarn service
at urban rates. (R. 130-131).
There is no evidence as to the actual classification
or the actual rates, or the variation therein as between
the franchise-granting or taxing municipalities ·and the
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rest of the state.
Nor is there any direct evidence to show the relative cost of serving the taxing as against the non-taxing
areas. Indeed, although the Company's case when presented showed an ultimate care in preparation (questions
and answers on direct examination were read from mimeographed sheets) the Company's m·anager on cross
examination was asked, "And, as I understand it, you
have no figures to show and here submit as to what
proportion of your earnings come from each of these
towns and whether they are bearimg their fair share
of the overall picture.re" He answered, "No, I don't have
a figure developed on each exchange of that type." (R.
149-150).
Moreover, he further testified that he "could not say"
whether the rural lines "pay their way" in equal proportion to the city base rate areas, as the Company
doesn't attempt to define its operations that fine, but
only develops overall costs. (R. 134-135). And he admitted (R. 143) that it might be true that in a given exchange
the Company operates at a loss, although the Company
doesn't "attempt to define" areas in the state where
costs might be in excess of expense of operation. It
does "maintain records on the total cost of operation
within the state and make rates to take care of those
expenses." (Ibid.)
The Company's manager further admitted that cost
of service varied with the distance from the exchange:
* it is cheaper for us to furnish service to a man
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a block away than it is a 1nile away." The admission that
costs vary directly with distance from the exchange is
implicit in the extra rharge for urban service to a subscriber loeated outside the urban base rate area. (R.131).
This, of course, is obvious, so obvious that the Court
would, we believe, take judicial notice thereof even in
the absence of this admission. Probably this circumstance is the reason the Company does not do any cost
accounting on an area basis: such accounting would
disclose that the urban areas are "carrying" the rural
areas and the areas in which new development is taking
place.
If rates were made on an area basis, instead of
state-wide, these urban areas would certainly be in a
better bargaining position, and doubtless would refuse
to "carry" the others, which would make it more difficult
to extend the system into new and more sparsely populated areas. Doubtless this is the basis of Mr. Sawyer's
comment (R. 145) that it wouldn't be to the interest of
"all" the users of service "to attempt to break down
rates that fine."
Perhaps we should pause here to say that the City
does not here object to the principle of fixing rates on
a state-wide basis-what it objects to is the departure
therefrom with respect to franchise fees and taxes, especially in the absence of any evidence to show any reasonable basis in fact for that departure from established
and approved practice.
Let us now turn to the documentary evidence which
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was introduced, Exhibit 2. (R. 17-20).
A glance at sheet 2 thereof (R. 18) discloses that
the municipalities receiving franchise fees or occupational tax include substantially all of the state's larger
and more densely populated cities lying within the state's
central valley, in which, as the court judicially knows,
there are concentrated the great bulk of our population
and of our industrial and comme.rcial activity. Salt
Lake City, Ogden, Provo, Logan, Murray, Farmington,
Brigham City, Price, Bountiful, Vernal, Spanish Fork,
Richfield and St. George all fall in this group. In all
of them the bulk of the subscribers obviously will live
near the central exchanges where the unit cost of equal
service will be lowest-how much lower the applicant
Company was not interested in saying, nor the complaisant Commission in hearing. But under present rate
policies these communities are the very ones where the
subscriber now pays the highest rates, because he has
available at his local exchange a larger number of telephones which he can call, without toll charge, (whether
or not he will have any occasion to do so) if he should
wish to do so.
On the other hand, turning to sheet 4 of Exhibit 2
(R. 20), we find listed the communities which are paid
nothing as franchise fees or occupation tax. They include
among others equally insignificant, the towns of Alton,
Amalga, Annabella and Antimony; Henefer, Henrieville,
Hiawatha and Honeyville ; Paradise, Paragonah, Perry
and Pickleville. It is doubtful if many lifetime residents
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of Utah will have any idea where they are, and many
people will never have heard of some of them. There
is no definite information in the record, but it is obvious
that few of them will have their own exchanges, and
very few will actually serve, through wires and cables
upon their public streets, any great number of subscribers outside their corporate limits. In the.se areas
the bulk of the subscribers obviously live at a relatively
great distance from the central exchanges, and there are
obviously fewer of them, so that the unit cost of equal
service will be higher-how much higher the Company
was not interested in saying nor the Commission in
hearing. Yet under present rate policies these areas are
the ones where the subscriber pays the lowest rates
for service, because he has available at his local exchange
a smaller number of telephones he can call, without toll
charge.
Obviously under these eircumstances the bulk of the
Company's profits are derived from the franchise communities, and those communities in fact now bear some
substantial proportion of the burden and expense of
serving the other areas, some of which, as the Company
admits, may very well be [and probably are] operated
at a loss, and contribute nothing to the overall ope,ration.
The urban, franchise areas are "carrying" the outside areas, and the discrimination existing is agaitnst
rather than in favor of the franchise areas. Very likely
that is just why the Company has protected its position
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in the franchise areas by negotiating long term franchise
agreements with these cities, and why the Commission
has approved the franchises when submitted.
The Company and the Commission obviously have
forced the shoe on the wrong foot. The Commission's
finding (if any there is) of discrimination against nonfranchise areas not only is unsupported by any competent
evidence, it is also contrary to the necessary inferences
which must be drawn from the evidence before it. Its
order cannot be allowed to stand.
Although it seems that recently utilities all over the
nation, led and guided by the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, are recently seeking to "pass on"
franchise fees and rentals, etc., to their city subscribers,
we have been been able to find only one case in which
a court of last resort has had occasion to review and pass
upon the sufficiency of the evide~ce adduced to support
the utility's claim (nobly and unselfishly made in behalf
of its downtrodden rural customers) that franchise fees
discriminate against rural users. But the facts there are
so nearly identical with the facts in this case, and the
reasoning there adopted by the very learned and able
Supreme Court of Missouri is so applicable and cogent
that we cannot forebear to examine and quote from it
at some length. We believe it will be very helpful to
this court. We submit the principles there declared are
controlling here.
That case is
State vs. Public Service Commission, 245
S.W. 2nd 851 (Mo., 1952).
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There is a priYatPly owned utility, the St. Louis
County 'Yater Cmnpany, supplied water to 66 incorporated and nu1nerous unincorporated areas in St. Louis
County, .Jlissouri. Its rates had always been fixed on
a systen1 wide basis. Later 16 of the incorporated are~as
levied special taxes upon the gross receipts of the Company. Conceiving that these rates resulted in discrimination against consumers in non-taxing areas, the Company filed with the Public Service Commission a new
schedule of rates, which (as here) made no change in
the basic rates, but added the amount of the gross receipts taxes to the bills of consumers within the taxing
municipalities, except that in cities where the Company
had a franchise, the C ompawy proposed to absorb the
first 2% (apparently as a reasonable franchise or rental
fee) and to charge the balance to the consumers within
the municipality.
The Commission found that it was "an unjust discrimination for the water consumers of one area to be
burdened with any part of the taxes levied or payments
exacted by another area" and "that the consumers in
any and all municipalities which seek to obtain revenue
from such taxes or payments should bear the burden of
providing such revenue." The Commission, moreover,
regarded the franchises as immaterial, and held that the
entire tax, "whether in the nature of license taxes,
occupation taxes, street rentals, franchise payments" or
otherwise should be paid by consumers within the municipality receiving the same.
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The Commission also held that recovery of these
expenses should be made in the rates themselves, rather
than by adding the same to the bill as a separate item.
(In this the Missouri Commission's order differs from
the order in our case, as will be demonstrated in a later
section of this brief.) It accordingly ordered new rate
schedules filed which would include an allocation of
these payments.
Thereupon the City of St. Louis procured from
the Missouri Supreme Court a writ of review.
The court observed that this was not a general rate
hearing, but a proposal by the Company (and not a consumer) to adjust inequalities resulting from the taxes.
(This is also true of the case at bar.)
The court observed that the Commission might have
classified the cities and towns and fixed rates on a unit
basis, but that the Company is organized and operates
on a system wide basis, and all its properties, "irrespective of the conglomerate political subdivisions in
its system, have been valued, and both rates and the right
to a fair return have been determined upon that basis."
It deelared,

"* * * all taxes, including taxes on gross receipts, are a part of operating expense, * * * .and
no doubt were and may be taken into consideration by the Company when it becomes necessary
to determine or redetermine rates or a fair return.
* * * But regardless of the respective merits of
the two methods of operation, the Company operates on the system wide basis, and the Commission
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has heretofore approYed its rates and return on
that basis, and both are now in the anomalous
position of disregarding the system basis and
treating this one item of operating expense upon
a segregated, municipal nnit basis." (Emphasis
supplied.)
(This also is true in the case at bar.)
The court then examined the facts and the record
to determine whether or not the payments to the municipalities did in fact result in discrimination. Attempting to prove disparity, the Company had submitted the
following:
1. Charts showing gross revenue per customer, and
ranking the cities levying the tax ;
2. Charts ranking the tax levying cities by gross
revenue per mile; and
3. Charts ranking the tax levying areas with respect
to revenue received from such areas as compared to
taxes paid.
The Commission found that in 24 of the 66 cities
served, about 75% of the revenue received came from
the taxing cities. But there were no charts showing
total gross receipts, or net income, nor any demonstration that there was any impairment of the Company's
fair return in the areas levying the tax.
(Obviously the applicant there went farther than
the happlicant here in attempting to prove discrimination without reasonable basis-and failed.)
The Court there says :
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"The Order and the Company's position
erroneously presuppose that there was no discnimination in the former uniform rates in the
.first place and, of course, that assumption is
without foundation. * * * It certainly costs the
Company less to serve some areas than it does
others, and necessarily there is a corresponding
discrimination inherent in uniform rates throughout the system. In the areas that are less costly
to serve there is undoubtedly a greater profit
to the Company than in the more costly areas
and that results in discrimination in rates ·in
favor of the costly areas. If any of the municipalities levying the tax are in the less costly ar.ea-s,
the addition of the tax to their water rates obvious1y increases the burden of tbe discrimination.
There is no data in this record from which precise
information may be obtained, but for the most
part the cities levying the tax are the greatest
in density of population and contribute the greater .sums to both the Company's gross and net
revenue. Those areas in which the Company
'has a franchise or -valuable contract rights -certainly make the greater contribution to the Company's stability and successful operation. From
an ope-rational standpoint they are in a more
favorable position for rate making purposes than
.some isolated, unincorporated area, or some other
more costly area, and yet uniform .rates ignore
these disparities. In short, there is a disparity
in the ·former uniform system wide raies and ·the
discrimination is favoraole, undoubtedly, to thB
more costly areas, and the taxes involv.ed in this
proceeding may or may not shift that unfavorable disparity; from all that appears in this
record .tme ttaxes may .have equalized the previously existing ilnequalities. But if it does, it does
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not necessarily follow that the amount of the
resulting difference is precisely the amount of
the ta...\:, or that a exceeds the more favorable rate
previously enjoyed by the more costly operational areas or, in short, that the discrimination
is unfair and unjust.
··There is no reasonable basis upon this
record for the Commission's finding and order;
accordingly the judgment is reversed." (Emphasis added.)
The case is obviously and exactly in point, and
supports completely the position of the City herein.
Moreover it is in complete harmony with the principles
established by our Utah Statutes and by this Court in
the case of
~Iountain

States Tel. and Tel. Company vs.
Public Service Commission, 105 Utah
230, 142 Pac. 2nd 873; Rehearing denied 105 Utah 266, 145 Pac. 2nd 790,
holding that a Commission order purporting to equalize rates is invalid unless based on "evidence calculated
to show that existing * * * rates were inherently unreasonable."
The only other cases we have found dealing with
the establishment of rate practices in which it was proposed that franchise fees or occupational taxes be
''passed on'' to the local consumer as an addition to his
basic rate are .oot in point. They are
City of Elmhurst v. Western United Gas Company (111., 1936) 1 N. E. 2nd 144, and
State vs. Department of Public Welfare 142 Pac.
2nd 498, 532 (Wash. 1943).
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In neither of these cases was there a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to prove that existing practice of handling these items as general operating expense produced an unfair or unreasonable discrimination against outside consumers. Moreover, in each of
these cases, as the Missouri Court observes in its case
above cited, there was a complete valuation of properties and complete determination of rates and fair
return. And the Washington case distinguishes the
EJ.mhurst case. It was decided under a statute authorizing, apparently, the segregation of single municipalities as regional units, and the fixing of uniform rates
within the city unit. That is a basically different sitation.
The assumption that the assumed difference in burden discriminates against the ratepayer outside the
franchising municipalities is unjustified, and is against
the law and the evidence.

Third, it was assumed that the assumed difference
and dicrimination is exactly equal to the amount of the
tax in each municipality involved. This is obvious from
the fact that the Commission purported to correct such
discrimination by its order authorizing the exact amount
of the tax to be "passed on" to rate payers within each
municipality. It made no attempt to inquire as to possible compensating factors, such as variations in labor
cost, in ad valorem taxes, in building rentals or in cost
of private easements for pole-lines and cables. It made
no inquiry as to whether or not there was, in the seve.ral
areas, relative equality of re~turn in proportion to the
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capital investment in property used in serving such
areas. Doubtless an audit and complete study will show
that discrimination exists, and will disclose the amount
thereof for or against the several arease, hut the assertions without examination of the facts and background,
that the rates found satisfactory seven months before
now discriminate in the amount of the tax, to the very
penny and to the hundredth of a per cent in each of 46
cities, under widely differing conditions, strains credulity
to the breaking point, and assumes without proof a fact
which could not possibly oecur in one chance out of billions. It serves only to point up that the Company and
the Commission were proceeding upon a premise basically wrong in fact and law.
This presumption just assumes the impossible. If
rates are to be adjusted on a community level, evidence
must be taken to establish a reasonable basis for the
adjustment to be made in each community, and specific
findings made for each community fixing the amount
and the direction of each adjustment.

To order an adjustment equal to the amount of the
tax, without any evidence to prove that the discrimination equals that amount is to act arbitrarily and capriciously, and in violation of the rule of law placing the
burden of proof on the proponent Company. Whether
in this case the burde.n of proof is conceived of as being
the "risk of persuasion" or only the "burden of going
forward," is quite immaterial, for here the Company
has supported neither burden, and the order it procured
from the Commission must fall.
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Fourth, it was assumed that there was no reasonable basis for the assumed difference and discrimination.

It is of course recognized that differences in cost
of service, in capital invested in rendering service, in
service rendered and in operating conditions justify a
difference in rate. If differences in operating conditions,
costs, etc., differ, then the rates also must differ, and
an exactly compensated, equal rate is unreasonable. Such
was the rule established by this court in the Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Comparwy case} supra.
Indeed, we do not believe that defendants here
would contend for any other rule. The Company fought
for and established that rule in that case, and presumably its present rate system is based thereon. However, if it be ·conceded that in this case the burden of
existing rates varies from community to community,
so do the rates} and there is no evidence to show that
the relation between burden and rate in any community
was not fair and reasonable, nor was any attack made
on the order of August 10, 1951, which must, under the
law, be presumed to have been regularly and properly
entered, and based on necessary evidence.
And it will be remembered that the Company's only
witness, its Utah Manager, testified positively that he
had no evidence to present to show whether any community was or was not bearing its fair share of the
costs in the overall picture. (R. 149-150).
Apparently the Commission realized this, for it
found only (and inferentially) that the franchise fees
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and the ta...~e~ re~ulted in discrimination. It did not find
that the di~eriininntion 'n1s tu1reasonable, and in making
an order "ithout such finding it acted arbitrarily, contrary to established law, and in excess of its jurisdiction.
The Connnission's order here is not based on any
evidence showing that present rates are unreasonable,
and it 1nnst fall under the authority of the Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company case, supra,
which the Company itself brought here.
Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. In
this old precept lies the very essence of justice, western
style.
Inasmuch as the Company and the Commission are
now flirting with the idea of turning further away from
the system wide basis for rates and towards a local
community or exchange basis, it probably is not amiss
here to raise a query as to the validity of the present
quasi-exchange basis where the urban subscriber's telephone rate is based on the number of telephones on his
exchange available to his call, whether or not he has
any use for them. The Company and the Commission
shudder at the thought of apportioning capital and
costs of operation (except taxes which can be "passed
on") upon a local commtu1ity basis, with appropriate
variation in rates to match, but they already, and happily, apportion the fancied benefits of telephone service
according to the size of the exchange, and vary the rates
accordingly.
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It seems unlikely that there is a sound and reasonable basis for the discrimination last mentioned. Year
in and year out, it is doubtful that the average subscriber in Ogden calls more than fifty telephones, more
or less, from his residence phone, or is called by more
than about 50 other subscribers. Very few people "get
around" so much that they have even a "phoning acquaintance" with fifty other families or business firms.
Twenty or thirty families and a half dozen business
firms would (as a guess) be nearer the limit of the average residence telephone subscriber's circle. But notwithstanding this relatively limited use in practice, the
Ogden subscriber must pay rates based on the 20,000,
more or less, telephones he could dial if he wanted to
embark upon that monumental and idle effort.
If rate structures must be re-examined on a local
basis, as the Company here proposes, then the only fair
and just method, and, we submit, the only legal method,
is to re-examine all factors of rate structure on a local
basis, including this rate system which obviously charges
the highest rate for the service provided at lowest cost
in order to give service at less than cost to some remote
and sparsely settled community. To make local adjustments on any other basis is to play tag with justice
in the dark, and must inevitably result in unreasonable
and unfair discriminations arrived at by purest guess
work.
We do not believe that the Company and the Commission can fairly and reasonably make local rate
differentials solely with regard to the cost of franchise
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Iill

fees or occupation taxE's. \Y e do not believe they can
be "a little bit pregnant" with local rate making and
still comply with the law.
This court n1ight well save much time and trouble
if it would establish for the Commission's guidance in
possible further proceedings, the principles above outlined, which, it is submitted, must be followed if the
defendants here are to proceed with their project of
rate making on a local basis.
This court has already held in the Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company case, supra, that
rates should be established that will as near as possible
yield a fair return on property used in rendering each
class of service. (Syllabus No. 9). Here, although the
several communities are classified for rate making, no
attempt was made to prove that the communities who
boldd bear the increased burden imposed hy the order
are not already yielding the Company a fair return on
the property used in serving them.
At any rate, the Commission's present order is based
on a finding of diS'crimination unfounded on any evidence, and it should be vacated.
The only other cases we have found dealing with
the establishment of rate practices in which it was proposed that franchise fees or occupational taxes be
"passed on" to the local consumer as an addition to his
basic rate are:
City of Elmhurst v, Western United Gas
Company (Ill., 1936) 1 N.E. 2nd 144, and
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State vs. Department of Public Service, 142
Pac. 2nd 498, 532 (Wash. 1943).
In neither of these cases was there a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that existing
practice of handling these items as general operating
expense produced an unfair or unreasonable discrimination against outside consumers. Moreover, in each of
these cases, as the Missouri Court observes in its case
above cited, there was a complete valuation of properties and complete determination of rates and fair return.
And the Washington case distinguishes the Elmhurst
case. It was decided under a statute authorizing, apparently, the segregation of single municipalities as regional
units, and the fixing of uniform rates withitn the city
unit. That is a basically different situation.
We do not believe that the Company and the Commission can fairly and reasonably make local rate differentials solely with regard to the cost of franchise fees
or occupation taxes. We do not believe they can be "a
little bit pregnant" with local rate making and still
comply with the law.
POINT 3. There is no evidence to support the finding of the Commission to the effect that the Company's
customers outside the cities (including 0 gden City) contribute a part of the franchise fees and special taxes,
while receiving little or no direct benefit ther·efrom.
We have already pointed out that the only evidence
in the record indicates that telephone users in the enfranchising cities in fact contribute to the support of
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.service to users outside such cities, rather than vice
versa, and we will not belabor that point.
However, the Commission also states in its Report
(R. 29) that the outside customers receive little or no
direct benefit from the use to which the tax receipts are
put. This statement also requires some consideration.
It is submitted that the finding is unsupported by and is
contrary to the evidence. It is further submitted 'that
the finding ·is completely irrelevant, and is based on a
misconception of the nature and ·purpose of franchise
fees, or "'street rentals," paid by utilities to municipalities.
As we -have said, Ogden's franchise agreement with
the Company is clearly established as one in tne nature
of a 25 year contract leasing to the Com,pa~y the privilege of using the city's public streets and alleys for pole
lines, ._telephone cables, etc., in the prosecution :of the
Company's ;private business, which it ver:y properly ~c.on
ducts for private profit. This is a privilege wJrich no
private person or corporation may .enjoy as of right.
It m~y be enjoyed only upon special .grant from the
so-rereign in Utah, the sovereign people. These concepts are fundamental, and in accord with the :authorities generally. See
Utah Light and Traction Company vs. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118
Pac. 2nd 683, 689.
See-also
23 Am. J ur. "Franchises," § § 2 to 8, pp. 714
to 720; and
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37 C.J.S. "Franchises," § § 1 to 14, pp. 141
to 158.
In Utah, the people have delegated to the local
authorities the exclusive right to grant this privilege
to telephone companies as to city streets, and have
specifically forbidden the legislature to grant any such
right without the consent of local authority. The sovereign people, in
Article XII, 'Section 8 of the Constitution of
Utah,
have declared that
"No law shall be passed granting the right
to construct and operate a * * * telephone or
electric light plant within any city * * * without
the consent of the local authorities who have
control of the street or highway proposed to be
occupied for such purposes."
This court has held that, even assuming that this
constitutional provision has no application to interurban railroads, a municipality clearly has the right
to grant or withhold the right to the use of the streets
therein, and thus to impose conditions respectilng the
use thereof for purposes other than the right of ordinary travel thereon.
Shortino vs. Salt Lake and U. R. Co., 52
Utah 476,488, 174 Pac. 860.
The Legislature has, perhaps superfluously, implemented this right granted cities by the Constitution. In
Section 15-8-14, U.C.A. 1943,
it has provided that
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··They [the City Com1nissions] may construct,
maintain and operate * * * telephone lines * * *'
or authorize the construction, maintenance and
operation of the same by others * * *."
And in
Section 15-8-13, U.C.A., 1943,
it has provided that
'"They 1nay regulate the * * • use of streets

"'"'"'"
In the case of

Union Pac. R. Company vs. Public Service
Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 Pac. 2nd
±69 (Syllabi 7, 8 and 9),
this Court held that, under the constitutional and statutory grants of power to cities, a city may impose terms
and conditions upon its grant of a franchise, and revoke
the franchise for breach thereof. It further held that,
although the provisions of a franchise agreement with
respect to rates are subordinate to the Commission's
exclusive control of rates, in all other matters respecting franchises for the special use of city streets the
city's powers and rights are not in any way subject to
the control of the Commission. The Court commented
that inasmuch as it construed the Public Utilities Act
as not granting the Commission any jurisdiction over
city street franchises, no question is presented of delegation of municipal functions to a special commission
in violation of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.
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It is clear that, in using Ogden's streets and the
streets of her sister cities, the Company is enjoying a
special privilege which it could not enjoy except by
consent of and arrangement with the local representatives of the inhabitants. These streets have been opened,
improved and maintained by the inhabitants, either
by special assessment levied on the abutting property
owners or by general tax levy on all property owners
within the corporate limits. The streets belong to the
cities' inhabitants. In using the streets for telephone
lines, the Company imposes thereon a special burden,
and enjoys a special privilege which no other inhabitant
or taxpayer enjoys. It is only proper that it should
compensate the inhabitants for suffering that burden
and granting that privilege.
"But," say the Company and the Commission (with
one voice), "the money to pay that compensation comes
in part from telephone users outside the city, who do
not participate in the spending thereof, and therefore
they get no benefit therefrom, and are injured."
The answer is that the first part of the charge is
not true, as hereinabove demonstrated, and the second
part looks on the wrong side of the problem, and is
equally untrue. Conceding for the moment (for the
sake of argument only) that the outside users do not
participate in the benefit of the spendilng by the city,
it does not follow that they do not benefit directly and
materially from the payment.
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They are pa~ing for phone service. They get it.
In the course of rendering that service the Company
uses the city streets. EYery time the rural subscriber
uses his phone his call travels along the Company's lines
in the streets of the city where the Franchise is located.
He cannot complete a phone call even to a rural neighbor
across the street without using the streets of the exchange city. In \Yeber County, as an example, the phones
of the entire county (and part of Davis County), with
the exception of about 300, phones in the Huntsville Area,
are on the Ogden Exchange. Every call from a rural
subscriber travels over the streets of one or the other
of these municipalities - and could not be completed
were it not that the citizens of these municipalities accord
to them, through the Company, the privilege of clearing
the calls through their streets. It is significant that in
Weber County only the two exchange cities, Ogden and
Huntsville, are paid franchise fees. (R. 18).
If the Company were compelled to obtain exclusively
private rights-of-way for its pole lines and cables within
the City limits, in order to serve its rural subseribers,
the cost to the Company and the subscribers would
doubtless be very substantially higher.

Moreover, from an examination of the list of enfranchising cities (R. 18), it is apparent that they are
the central exchanges in the Company's complex of interconnecting long distance service. The inference is clear
and necessary that relatively very few long distance calls
are handled by the Company in Utah without routing the
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message through the streets of one of several of these
municipalities. Here again is a direct benefit in telephone service and use of streets resulting to the users
of telephones throughout the state.
Elsewhere in its findings the Commission recognizes
this benefit, when it says:
"It is undoubtedly true that telephone subscribers outside Ogden City limits are benefited
by reason of being served by the same telephone
utility and through the same exchange as subscribers residing within the limits of the City of
Ogden. . . . When a subscriber in Ogden calls a
station in Roy the conversation is carried over
lines traversing the streets of Ogden for a distance, and over lines in Weber County outside the
City of Ogden for a much longer distance. The
same situation is true when a party in Roy caJls
a party in Ogden." (R. 32-Emphasis added.)
The, Commission also observes (R. 32) that
"Ogden City also receives ad valorem tax
benefits from telephone plant facilities located
within the limits of Ogden City which are devoted
to serving subscribers outside the City limits."
But it neglected to observe that the outside subscribers
also receive the benefit of ad valorem taxes on that city
plant by virtue of the county levy thereon. It neglected
to observe that under Utah law the property-owning
city subscriber pays a tax (through the County levy) to
maintain County roads along which the Company's lines
run, but that there is no compensating tax on County
property to maintain the City streets which are used
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for all County calls. And it neglected to observe that
none of these ad Yaloren1 ta.~es pays for, or entitles the
taxpayers in question to, the special privilege of using
the city streets for the stringing of telephone lines and
the laying and relaying of underground telephone cables.

In neglecting these matters, the Commission failed
to take into account factors of vital importance involved
in a proper deternrination of whether the city subscriber
benefits at the hands of his country cousin, or vice versa.
Not having considered these matters, it is apparent that
the Commission's finding that the country subscriber
receives no benefit from his pittance of franchise money
is a mere guess, and not founded on any evidence.
The City, however, does heartily concur in the following finding of the Commission:
"Where the benefits flow and to whom is
highly conjectural and cannot be accurately measured." (R. 32-Emphasis added.)
Now that is exactly what we are contending: the
finding that the country subscribers receive no benefits
from franchise fees paid is only a guess or conjecture
and cannot be measured or supported. The Commission
here recognizes that there is in the record absolutely no
evidence to form the necessary basis for any comparison
-and the Company admitted it had no such evidence
available.

This finding is an admission by the Commission that
its Order is based on mere conjecture. With such an
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admission in the Record, neither the finding of "no benefit to country subscribers" nor the order based thereon
can stand.
The fact that the franchise fee is not spent directly
on the country subscriber by the City authorities after
it has been received by them of course is utterly irrelevant. They receive their benefit-their quid pro quoin the special privilege of using the City's streets in
completing phone calls.
Exactly the same argument can be made with equal
force (or rather, with equal lack of force) that city ad
valorem taxes paid by the Company should be charged
back to city subscribers because they vary in amount,
and are spent on city projects rather than to benefit
telephone subscribers in the far corners of the state.
Exactly the same argument can be made with equal
force (or rather, equal lack of force) that the landlord
who rents an office building to the Company for an exchange should have the amount of the rent charged back
to him on his telephone bill because he spends it on himself and his family, instead of using it to buy hats or
telephone taborets for all other subscribers. This is
absurb, and the premise on which the argument is based
is patently false. The attempted determination of relative benefits is without foundation either in evidence,
in logic, or in law. It must fall.
POINT 4. The finding of the Commission, to the
effect that there is no evidence that the City's franchise
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;

contract leas ern.fered into with the intent that the funds
to pay the city for the rights thereby acquired by the
Company would come from the general income of the
Company, is contrary to all of the competent evide:nce
in the proceeding, and contrary to law.
The Company's franchise with Ogden was "negotiated" by its manager in 19-!1. (R. 125). At that time the
established rate structure, approved by the Commission,
was on a state-wide basis, and the cost of all franchise
fees was "absorbed" by the Company as a general expense. It was treated as a general expense in computing
rates, in accord with the almost universal practice.
The manager understood at the time that the Ogden
City officials, in entering into the negotiations and into
the franchise, acted in a representative capacity, and that
the inhabitants of Ogden were the real parties in inte.rest. (R. 127). That is the way our republican form of
government works-through representative public servants.
The manager, and, obviously, the representatives of
the city also understood and recognized the difference
between the state sales tax and the federal excise tax
on telephones, on the one hand, and franchise fees and
occupation taxes on the other, and that the burden of the
former is imposed on the consumer, or customer, while
the latter is imposed on the Company enjoying the benefits of the franchise or the license to do business. (R.
127-128).
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It was also understood that the franchise fee and
free service to be paid and rendered to the City under
the franchise contract were in consideration of the grant
of the franchise privilege to use the city streets for the
Company's telephone business. (R. 125-126).
The obvious and necessary inference from this history and background, and from the situation of the parties is that in entering into the franchise agreement with
the Company, the object of the City officials was to make
a contract beneficial to the people they represented.
Their object in selling this privilege for the special use
of the streets at a stipulated consideration in money to
be paid and services to be rendered was obviously to
benefit the City's inhabitants by exacting from the Company a quid pro quo which would either result in lower
taxes or in higher services to the general inhabitantsand in this connection it must be noted that a city is not
operated for profit, but for service to its citizens.
If the purpose of the parties had been merely to aid
the company, or merely to facilitate the rendering of
telephone service to the city's population, it would have
been idle-it would even have been a hind;rance to the
accomplishment of that purpose to exact a consideration
for the franchise grant. If the purpose had been no more,
the franchise ordinance and collateral agreement (R. 2122) would not have provided for payment of a consideration. In such event all payments would have been waived, as has been done in many cities, according to the
Company's manager. Obviously the purpose and intent
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of both the city offieials and the Company :Manager were
to benefit the real parties in interest: the inhabitants
of the city.
It is equally obYions that this purpose would be
frustrated if the exact an1ount and value of this consideration were immediately charged back to the inhabitants as a surcharge upon their particular telephone bills.
That process merely puts money in one pocket and removes it from another, and no benefit whatever accrues.
By that process the inhabitants part with a valuable right
in their streets and, in the final analysis, they get nothing
in return.

Clearly the parties had no such purpose in mind.
Clearly it was intended that the money to pay the franchise fees would come out of the general income of the
Company, in accordance with the then prevailing practice and the situation of the parties at the time.
Perhaps a simplified illustration will aid in presenting this point. Suppose the Company should at a rental
of $100 per month, lease an exchange building from a
family corporation with only five stockholders. Suppose
further that each stockholder is a telephone subscriber.
And now suppose that the Company proposes to add
$20 to the monthly telephone bill of each stockholder,
for the express and declared purpose of exacting the rent
from the stockholders, "because the landlord corporation
spends the rent money on the stockholders, and not on
the rest of the Company's subscribers!"
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This illustration, we believe, reduces the principle
espoused by the Company and the Commission to its
utterly silly essentials. Who can reasonably contend that,
in such a case, either the landlord corporation or the
Company intended that the rental should be exacted by
the Company from the landlord's five stockholders-or
from any three or four of them~
Clearly there was no such intention in this case, but
the parties intended that the franchise fee would be
paid out of the Company's general income so that Ogden's
stockholder-inhabitants can enjoy the fruits and benefits of the franchise contract made for them.
Perhaps we should add a brief reference to the law
governing the construction of franchise contracts.
Except that franchise contracts are always construed
most strictly against the grantee Company,
37 C.J.S., p. 167, notes 7 to 9,
the rules applicable to the construction of contracts generally apply to the construction of a franchise contract.
37 C.J.S., p.166, note 95.
Accordingly the intention of the parties governs,
37 C.J.S., p. 167, note 1;
and if the terms are ambiguous, the purpose of the parties and the history of the negotiations may be considered. Ibid., note 5.
It is, of course, a general rule of contract construction that the nature and object of the agreement and the
situation of the parties may be considered.
17 C.J.S., p. 744.
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The construction given the contract by the parties
may also be considered.
17 C.J.S., p. 755.
In this latter connection, it is significant that for ten
years after Ogden's contract was negotiated the Company, without any question, paid the franchise fee out of
its general incon1e, and made no attempt to "pass it on"
to the city's stockholder-inhabitants until the move was
suggested by the Commission. ( R. 110). As soon as that
was done, the move was actively opposed by the City as
a breach of faith. Here is a clear construction of the contract by the long continued manner in which the party
obligated has performed.
Moreover, the law of the place where the contract
was made, in effect at the time the obligation was entered
upon, is deemed a part of the contract.
17 C.J.S., p. 782.
Here the established method of constructing rates,
approved by the legislative assent of the Commission
from the beginning of rate making in Utah, treated
franchise fees as general operating expense to be paid
out of general income. For fifty years the Commission
has applied this rule, and the Legislature, which must
have known of the practice, has taken no steps to revise
it. Clearly the rule has legislative approval, and is an
integral part of the utility rate making law of Utah.
As such it became part of the Franchise contract, and
determines the nature of the Company's obligation thereunder.
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And in the case of
State v. Department of Public Service,
(Washington, 1943) 142 Pac. 2nd, 498,
536, Syllabi 44-45,
the Supreme Court of Washington held, as a matter
of law, that reasonable franchise payments for special
street privileges, are part of a utility's general operating
expense, and must be paid out of general income. It
was held error for the Washington Department to direct that they be charged to the ratepayers of cities where
franchises were held. As Ogden's contract is a contract
for a· franchise fee (and not an occupation tax) this case
is exactly in point here and should be followed, and the
order of the Commission here requiring the "passing on"
of Ogden's franchise fee to her inhabitant telephone subscribers should be vacated.
The finding of the Commission here that there was
no evidence of intent that Ogden's franchise payments
were to be made out of general income is against all the
evidence and against the law, and erroneously places on
the city the burden of proof. It cannot stand.
POINT 5. The Order of the Commission impairs
the obligation of the Company's franchise contract with
the City and its inhabitants in violation of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States,
and of Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah.
It is apparent from what has been before that the
order of the Commission impairs the obligation of the

50
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Company upon its franchise contract made by Ogden
City for the benefit of its inhabitants, the real parties
in interest. It is therefore unconstitutional and void.
\Yhen this point "·as pressed before the Commission,
the Company raised two points in attempted answer:
first, that the obligation was not impaired, and second,
that a city cannot clai1n the protection of these provisions
of the national and state constitutions. It is submitted
that neither answer has any validity here.
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In the first place, it is here conceded that the City's
inhabitants are the real parties in interest; the contract
was for their benefit. Before the Order, the Company
paid their representatives, out of its own funds, the
amount of the franchise fee, and it was expended by their
public servants for their account and benefit. After
the Order, it is true, the franchise fee will still be paid
to the public servants of the inhabitants, to be expended
for their benefit, but the obligation to make that payment has been lifted from the obligor Company and saddler! upon the obligee inhabitants. The obligee has been
forced to assume the obligation; the inhabitants have become both obligee and obligor; and the Company, formerly the obligor, has been relieved of all obligation except to act as agent to gather the franchise fee from the
available inhabitants and deliver it to their servants
for expenditure. The obligation of the Company has
been whittled down from that of a debtor owing rentals
for a special street privileg-e, to that of a mere collecting
agent.
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It is as if the maker of a note were to be authorized
to say to the payee, "Of course I'll pay you-but only
when and if I have extracted the wherewithall from your
pocketbook."
It is idle to say that the obligation is not impaired.
The entire essence and benefit thereof has been destroyed.
A recognition of this practical result, which the
Commission obviously intended, is implicit in the quotation from its f1nding in the Mountain States Fuel
Supply Company case (P.S.C. No. 3755), which quotation it affectionately and approvingly included in its
findings here :
"If the customers of gas within the limits of
cities which impose such revenue measures are _
cognizant of the burdens imposed upon them by
their city officials, such customers will keep those
taxes or fees within reasonable limits...." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Commission found that "This finding applies with
equal force in this case." (R. 34). It was obviously aware
that by virtue of its order the "benefit" (R. 29) of receipts of franchise fees would now become a "burden"
(R. 34) to the city subscriber, a burden the Commission
expects him .to throw off.
If it be argued that the obligation runs to the municipal corporation, and not to the citizen-inhabitant stockholders, and the obligation to the corporation has not
been impaired, the answer is three-fold. First, it is
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court may have heard their shouts of "Robbery!" even
as far as Salt Lake City. 'Yhen the corporate fiction of
the city is disregarded, as it n1nst be here in the interests
of justice, and the City Government's representative
function is recognized, they stand before the court unencumbered to claim their constitutional rights. Two of
them, ~Ir. \V'". I. Lowe, and 1Ir. Clarence E. Smith, personally stood before the Commission below.

_
.
/
_
;:
~~

The second reply is that the rule is based upon considerations which have no application in Utah to these
facts. The reason behind the rule is that municipal
corporations are regarded as mere creatures of the state,
whose very existence depends upon the whim of the state
legislature which created them, and which can deprive
them of any right, as it can deprive them of existence.
But that situation does not obtain in Utah, and especially in the case of Ogden City. In Utah under Article
XII, Section 8 of the Constitution, the legislature cannot
interefere with the City's franchise power. It might repeal the general laws under which all cities (except
Ogden) exist (Constitution, Article XI, Section 5), but
so long as it allows them to exist as municipal corporations it cannot infringe their rights under the Constitution to grant or withhold telephone franchises, and impose conditions respecting the same. Only the people
can do that, by constitutional amendment, and they have
not acted. Only the Commission, the creature of the legislature has attempted to act, and it is elementary that the
legislature cannot delegate to a commission, its creature,
powers which it does not itself have. See
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16 C.J.S., pp. 344, note 61; 339, note 14(3);
and 342, note 41.
See also
City of Columbus v. Public Utilities Commission (Ohio, 1921) 133 N. E. 800, syllabi
26 to 31,
holding that the legislature cannot delegate to the Public
Utilities Commission power to nullify a City's franchise
contract in violation of the Federal prohibition against
impairing contract obligations.
Furthermore, franchise negotiations under Article
XII, Section 8, are clearly municipal .functions which
the Utah legislature is specifically prohibited from delegating to any commission by the provisions of
Article VI, Section 29, of the Constitution
of Utah.
This court held in
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Public
Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 200203, 134 Pac. 2nd 469,
that a city's power to grant franchises, and impose conditions, is exclusive, and that no order of the Commission
can reach or affect a city's rule made thereunder. It did
not apply, however, the Constitutional prohibition; it
held that the Legislature had not attempted to violate
the restriction, and that the Commission is without
statutory authority to regulate the terms of franchise
contracts. The payment of the franchise fee by the Com-
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pan.y, not the city's citizen beneficiaries, and the render-

ing of free serYice without direct charge to the citizen
beneficiaries. are in1portant and n1aterial conditions
properly unposed by Ogden City upon the granting of
the Franchise. The regulation of those conditions is
a city function, entirely beyond the scope of the Commission's authority. The Commission cannot, under the pretense of exercising its rate making power, meddle in exclusively city affairs.
Furthermore, since Ogden in 1951 adopted the
"Council-Manager Charter of Ogden City" pursuant to
the Constitution, Article XI, Section 5, it is no longer dependent on the legislature for its corporate existence.
It can no longer be abolished, nor its rights impaired by
any act of the legislature or its creatures. The reason for
- a city's disqualification to claim constitutional protection
against the legislature no longer applies to Ogden City.

It is apparent that in Utah the Legislature has no
power to meddle in Ogden's franchise contract, and can
- delegate no such power to the Commission. Therefore
there is no reason why the City is not free, with respect
· to such contract, to claim the protection of the Constitu:.:. tional prohibitions against impairing the obligations of
~ contracts.
Perhaps it should be added that the rate making
- power, under the guise and pretense of which the Com~ mission proceeded here is a legislative function, covered
[il'
by the constitutional restriction.
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43 Am. Jur. "Pub. Util." section 83, p. 624-

5.
But it must be noted that what the Commission was
actually trying to do, under this guise and pretense, was
to regulate city frarnchise contracts. That will be demonstrated later in this brief. But that is obviously still a
legislative function.
The Order is void because it impairs the obligation
of the Company's franchise contract with the City.
POINT 6. The Order of the Commission, by authorizing a specific and arbitrary set o[f, releases and
extinguishes, at least in part, the indebtedness, liability,
and obligation of the Company to the City under its franchise contract, in violation of Article VI, Sections 27 amii
29, of the Constitution of Utah.
Article VI, Section 27, of the Utah Constitution provides that
"The Legislature shall have no power torelease or extinguish, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation or person ... to any municipal corporation.

"
'Section 29 provides that
"The Legislature shall not delegate to any
special commission . . . any power to make, supervise, or interfere with any municipal . . .
money, property, or effects, whether held in trust
or otherwise, to levy taxes, . . . or to perform
any municipal functions."
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Here is a special protection for contract obligations
owing to the city, if any is needed. Clearly, neither the
legislature, nor (a fortiori) its creature, the Commission,
may release the obligation to Ogden of the Company's
City franchise contract.
Yet that is exactly what the Commission has attempted to do, as has been above demonstrated. It has
attempted to release the Company from its obligation
to the city and to impose in lieu thereof a new obligation
upon Ogden City telephone users-including the city,
for it uses more telephones than the "free service" affords.
The case of
St. George v. Public Utilities Commission,
62 Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720,
is not in point. The contract there was not a franchise
contract, protected also by Article XII, Section 8, but was
a contract for the sale of a municipal power plant for
- which the consideration, in part at least, was an agreement to furnif:h ''free'' city power for a term. There
the Commission ordered that the city be charged the
regular power rates, but fixed and allowed as a cred'it
;: against these power charges the value of the purchasing company's obligation to furnish "free" service
:-- for the term. Thus the form, and not the substance of
the obligation was affected, and the Court approved,
but even then Justice Gideon doubted the propriety of
approving a "re-writing" of the City's sale contract.
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Here the exact reverse is true-the substance, and
not the form of the obligation is affected. Here the
Order of the Commission would absolutely cancel the
Company's obligation, without providing any real compensatory benffit to the city and its inhabitants. It
clearly violates the Constitutional prohibitions.
POINT 7. The Order of the Commission is void
and beyond the powers of the Commission granted by
the legislat·ure, and is a void attempt to exercise power
to supervise and interfere with municipal money O!rltd
property and to levy municipal taxes and perform
municipal fwnctions, which powers the legislature cannot validly grant the Commission under Article VI,
Section 29, and Article XII, Section 8, of the Constitution of Utah.
The Order of the Commission as above demonstrated
completely re-writes the franchise contract, in its substance and effect. If carried out, it would effect a
novation by which the City's phone-using inhabitants
would be substituted as obligors in the place of the
Company. This goes far beyond any mere change in
form. A contract to grant a franchise in return for
service as the ''collector'' of a telephone use tax, is
quite a different thing from a contract to grant a franchise in return for an annual payment by the Com·
parny of $13,000 in money and services. There are
obvious and cogent reasons why the latter is much more
beneficial to the city as a whole, and much to be preferred when negotating a contract.
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Clearly the determination of the consideration for,
and conditions of a franchise grant is a matter of
municipal policy. Clearly the determination of the
amount a city occupation tax, and of the person upon
zrhom the burden thereof shall be imposed, is a matter
of municipal p•)licy. In the fixing of such policy the
local authorities are not subject to the control, direct
or indirect, of the Commission. They are controlled
only by gener:=tl law, and the Constitution. Matters of
public policy are not for the Commission.
Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Public
Service Commission, 103 Utah, 186, 200-203,
and
Idaho P.::, wer Company vs. Thompson 19 Fed. 2d
547, 580.
~
~
~

fl

Under the authority hereinbefore cited, the fixing
of franchise terms and conditions is purely and solely
a municipal function entirely beyond the scope of the
Commission's power. It is a function which the Legislature under Section 29, Article VI could not, even if
it would, delegate to the Commission.

Again, thir:; "re-write job" and this release of the
Company's obligation to the City is an obvious, and
~:
intolerable interference with the City's "municipal
~i'
money, property and effects." The order attempting
it is beyond the Commission's power, unconstitutional
!i and void.
$:

~i

That there may be no question, we call attention to
the fact that in the case of
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Logan City vs. Public Utilities Commission 72
Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961,
this Court held that Article VI, Section 29 of the Constitution applies to the Commission here.
For these reasons also the Order of the Commission
must be vacated.
POINT 8. The Order of the Commission by its
terms and in ef.fect unlawfully transforms a lawful and
proper franchise fee exacted from the Company into
an unlawful p1trchase, sales or use tax on the users of
telephone service, in violation of Article VI, Section 29,
Article XI, Section 5(a), and Article XIII, Section 5,
of the Constitution of Utah.
In considering this point we must first direct the
Court's attention specifically to the exact provisions of
the tariff regulation which the Commission's Order approves. It provides:
'' 1. Rate schedules of the Telephone Company in Utah, do not include any portion of any
sales, excise, franchise or occupation tax, costs
of furnishing service without charge, or similar
taxes ... "
2. Insofar as practical, any such taxes ...
or charges . . . may be hilled by the Company .to
its exchange customers on a pro-rata .basis,
with the amount thereof added to the btU for
service to the Company's subscribers in the area
wherein such taxes,'' etc. are levied against the
Company. (Emphasis supplied).

What are the Company and the Commission saying¥
Clearly and unequivocally they are saying, first, that
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franchise fees and special taxes against the Company
are no longer regarded by the Company as an operating
expense and so inc.luded in the rate structure, even
on a local basis; and seco11d, that such fees and taxes,
as such. may be billed to subscribers within the city
limits. Clearly this is not a rate increase equal to the
tax or fee, for ''Rate schedules ... do not include any
portion" thereof, and the amount is "added to the bill
for sen·ice. '' .Jioreover, some subscribers on the exchange, living near to but outside of the corporate
limits are rated as urban area subscribers at urban
area rates, but they are not to be billed for the tax,
because they are not ''subscribers in the area wherein
such taxes" and fees are levied against the Company.
The area of increase is limited strictly to the area in
which the City has territorial jurisdiction for tax purposes.
Even though in its order approving the tariff regulation the Commission uses some language consistent
with a rate increase on an exchange basis, it is obvious
that on such rate increase is in fact contemplated, for
- at least some exchange customers are not to be included.
It is the tax which is billed to the customers. This
-~ is made more than clear by the Commission's reference
to its case number 3755. (R 34). The Commission says:
''That case involved a request of Mountain
Fuel Snpply Company for authority to bill its
customers directly for certain mwnicipal taxes
arnd licenses . . .
In that case we said :
'If the consumers of gas within the limits
of cities ... are cognizant of the burdens imposed
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--~

upon them by their city officials, such consumers
will keep those taxes or fees within reasonable
limits.' " (Emphasis supplied.)

Notice that the language used does not here refer
to an increase in rates to compensate for taxes paid
by the Company, it refers to authority to bill the customers for "taxes and licenses." It refers to burdens
placed by ''city officials.''
Even though the Commission in its opinion also
refers to "increased rates due to such taxes " it is
'
submitted that the quoted "slips of the pen" reflect
the
true purpose and intent of the Commission; namely, to
force a reform in Municipal tax structures and franchise
contracts in accord with their own and the Company's
ideas of ''social and economic justice.'' They do not
believe that the inhabitants of cities should receive any
compensation for suffering the special burden of pole
lines over and cable lines under the streets they have
developed and paid for to earry vehicular and pedestrian travel. They will therefore order the "transfer"
of the burden of paying that compensation to the inhabitants who should receive it. The compensation is
effectively set off and cancelled, and the franchise "reformed.'' Even though it is apparent that the bulk
of the Company's revenue and profits are derived from
business done within the cities in question, they conceive it to be unjust and discriminatory for the cities
to levy for public purposes an occupation license tax
based on the revenues taken by the Company from the
inhabitants; They will therefore order the tax "passed
on," and extracted for the second time from the in-
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'
habitants. This effectin:-ly blocks the levying of any
license tax on the Company, and the Municipal tax
structure i~ •' reformed.'' The Commission's policy
emerges triumphant oYer public policy as fixed by the
constitution and hnn; of Utah.
Stripped to its basic essentials and cleared of the
pretense of "rate fixing", the actual result of the Order
is that the Company now pays no franchise or occut pation taxes, and the local authorities have lost the
ability to extract from the Company any compensation
- for the use of the streets, or to impose on the Company
~ any license tax for the privilege of earning a guaranteed
r 6% (or more) within the city limits.
As a result the amount of the franchise fee will
become a matter of indifference to the Company. It
:J: has an absolute monopoly, so the overall cost is of
little concern. In "negotiating" a new franchise their
-· attitude obviously will be "OK boys, how much~ We
11
·· don't pay it, so name your own figure and we will
!! rake it in for you!''
ti
This hardly seems a desirable goal to seek.
::;.1

On the other hand, the order fastens on the con•
1 sum.er in Ogden what is, in all its practical and realIt istic aspects, a purchase or use tax imposed on the coni. sumer of telephone service within the city limits. No
; matter how one looks at it, that is the effect of the
t order.
It cancels 1he franchise tax, and levies in lieu thereof
~: a city telephone-use or sales tax on city subscrihers.
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This clearly is in excess of the powers permitted
by the Constitution to the Legislature or its delegatee
Commission.
By Article XIII, Section 5, of the Constitution the
legislature is forbidden to levy any city, town or other
municipal tax, but is authorized to vest such power in
the local authorities. So far it has never seen fit to
vest the local P.uthorities with power to levy sales, purchase or use taxes on the sale or purchase of any commodity or service. The Commission has rushed in
where the local authorities themselves cannot tax.
And Article· VI, Section 29, forbids the legislature
to delegate to the Commission the power to levy any
taxes-but that has not restrained the Commission from
the attempt.
Ogden, as a charter city, derives its power to tax
directly from Article XI, Section 5 (a) of the Constitution-hut here also the power granted is the "power
prescribed by general law,'' and we know of no provision granting any municipality the right to levy a
tax of the kind here attempted.
The crux of this matter, of course, is whether or
not the additional burden imposed on the City's phone
subscribers is a tax, or an increase in cost of phone
service. If it is a charge for phone service, then we
must concede this point. If it is a tax of any kind,
then this point 8 is well taken. We submit it is in truth
and fact a tax.
We have found only one other case where this
problem was involved. It is the Washington case of
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State Y~. Department of Public Service 142 Pac.
498, 535.
The court makes no attempt to analyze the practical
result, but merely declares that
'' Th9re is no basis for the Argument advanced
by the cities that the department is seeking to

exercise the taxing power, or to interfere with
the exercise of that power by the cities. The
only question concerns the allocation of the
moneys paid by respondent to the cities under a
taxing ordinance or pursuant to franchise pro-

..

VlSIOnS •••

''

Nor does it clearly appear from that decision that
there the Order in question "passed on" the tax as
tax, as was attempted here, or merely increased exchange rates for service in an amount sufficient to
compensate the telephone company for its cost in municipal taxes in that exchange. From the Court's further
remarks on page 535 of the Pacific Report it would
__ seem that the latter it true. If so, the case is distinguishable on this point. The court says,
"We are of the opinion that the Department,
insofar as such taxes are concerned, has the
power to fix special exchwnge rates . . . which
will in effect require the rate-payers in each
community to absorb a sum equal to the amount
of the tax . . . More than this the department
cannot do.''
~ The case was remanded for further proceedings.

It
> would seem that the court was authorizing a bona fide
fixing of rates on a local, rather than on a state wide
~: basis, and presumably the department in its further
!~
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i~> t

proceedings would take evidence on all the factors necessary to fix fair rates on a. local rather than state-wide _;;~
ilin'
basis. The case seems not to be in point either on the
question of the sufficiency of evidence to prove existing discrimination, or on the· question of the effect of
"passing on" the tax as an exercise of tax power by the ~J:r
Washington Department.

In the briPfs filed by the parties hereto before the
Public Service Commission, which have been made part ;;.:
of the record and certified to this court, there are only =:efi
three cases cited which deal specifically with the question of passing locally imposed franchise charges and
occupation taxes on to the consumers within the area
imposing the tax. We have found no other cases di- :;:>
reetly on this question. The three cases are
City of Elmhurst vs. Western United Gas Com- :IG'~
pany (Ill., 1936) supra
State vs. Department of Public. Service (Wash., ~:a1'
r~
1943) supra
and

State of Mo. ex Rel. City of St. Louis vs. Public
Service Commission of Missouri (Mo., 1952)
supra.
The Missouri case is directly with the cities' con·
tention that the franchise and occupation taxes may
not be passed on. The Washington case is directly with
the city as to franchise fees, but as to occupation taxes
the Washington court allows the same to be passed on
to the users in the area concerned. The Illinois case
holds that the local levies there involved should be passed
on to users in the area imposing the same.
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·~~ (

The eity does not agree with the Washington court's
.: reasoning as to occupation taxes for the reasons set
forth in other parts of the brief.
But concecling for the purpose of argument that
--- occupation taxes and related local impositions can be
:·- lawfully passed on directly to users in the area, as to
franchise fees or charges the Washington court, on pag·e
_, 535 et seq. in Volume 1-!~ Pac. 2nd under subdivisions
43 to 46, incluE"iYe, clearly holds that franchise charges
. are different from occupation or business taxes and
-~- franchise charges cannot be passed on to users in the
- area taxed but must be considered general operating
~~ expense of the company.
Counsel fo1 the company, on page 12 of the Company's brief before the Commission, cites the Wash... ington case, supra, and a subsequent case,
State ex rei Seattle vs. Department of Public
Utilities 207 Pac. 2d 712 (Wash., 1949).
He then declares that in these ''cases'' the Washington
Court sustained an order authorizing the Company to
-· add ''use of street'' and other city taxes to its charges
> for municipal service.
Counsel then baldly declares that
"to all intents and purposes there can be no distinction
_:: between a franchise which grants the use of streets and
: ~ imposes a tax based upon the Company's gross revenue
-;..< for such use of streets and a tax imposed for the use of
~;. streets determined in the same manner. ''
~"'

-.-.:
It is true that in the latter case the Washington
:;_. Court sustained an order which authorized the passing
,.. on of use of street taxes imposed by the cities. How-
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ever, it is obvious from a reading of the case that the
ground for this decision is that the order of the department was entered under the direction of a judgment
entered by the Superior Court upon remittitur in the
first case, from which Superior Court judgment no
appeal had been taken. The court holds that under these
circumstances the judgment of the court below became
the law of the case and could not be disturbed, even
if erroneous, in the appeal taken some six years later
in a proceediir..g to review the order of the department
entered pursuant to the first judgment of the Superior
Court. The Washington Court refers to two earlier
Washington cases :

.,

~~I

-~:

~-'
-~;IJI.

:Ji;

Tucker vs. Brown
92 Pac. 2nd 221

and
Tucker vs. Brown
150 Pac. 2nd 604, 622,
and quotes with approval from the latter case as follows:

''If appellant was not satisfied with the ·· ".
judgment entered by the trial court upon the
remittitur, it could have petitioned this court
to correct that judgment. Having failed to take
appropriate action, appellant is foreclosed from
in any way objecting to the judgment.''
The W ashiagton court, in the Seattle rate case, then
says (Page 716) :
''The situation presented in the two cases
just mentioned, and that obtaining in this and
the first rate case, are entirely alike. The Brown
interests in the second case cited, were held to be
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· "·

:>'

~~mi!

bound by the judgment of the Superior Court
entered after the remittitur went down.''
~
Although the cities had petitioned for a recall of
:1 the remittitur in the earlier rate case when the Super, ior Court entered its mistaken judgment on remittitur,
t1 the petition to recall the remittiur was denied. The
rl court does not say why it was denied, but it would apMi: pear that probably the cities had mistaken their remedy
~- and should have made a second appeal from the judg!11! ment entered on the remittitur. Perhaps they did not
~! act in time. However that may be, this case is certainly
~! not any clear authority for the points on which it IS
cited. Moreover, in the first Washington rate case,

l

~

State vs. Department of Public Service
142 Pac. 2nd 498, 533,
the Washington Court very clearly and carefully distinguished between payments due under franchise contracts for the use of streets and all other special municiiif pal taxes and held that the former could not be passed
·, on, and there 1s nothing said by the court in the later
~~ case which in any way weakens its ruling on that dis~'. tinction. Counsel's assertion with respect to franchise
~;: contracts and use of street taxes is contrary to the
,_: authority on which he relies.
J

~

The agreement between Ogden City and the Com~)2 pany here is clearly a franchise contract, and the first
Washington case is clear authority, not weakened by
,, the second cas8, for the city's position that the charges
1
-ia~ there agreed to be made cannot be legally passed on,
,jl but a.s a matte-r:· of law must be paid by the Company as
~~·:a general operating expense out of its general income.
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The third case, Elmhurst vs. W es·tern United Gas
Company is referred to in the first Washington case
and its reasoning rejected as to franchise payment~
but approved as to occupation taxes. As the Washington court observes, the Elmhurst case is. distinguishable from the Washington case (and from the case at
Bar) because, "It would seem that the case presented
to the Illinois court did not involve a utility engaged
in state-wide operations. Jus.t how much territory the
utility which was a party to that proceeding served
cannot be determined from the opinion. The situation
was not entirely comparable to that presented in the
case at Bar.'' pp. 537 of 142 Pac. 2nd.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission '
acted illegally, arbitrarily and capriciously, and in excess of its jurisdiction in entering the Order complained
of, and that the Order should be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHER
First Security Bank Building .
Ogden, Utah
JACK A. RICHARDS
CHARLES H. SNEDDON
Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah

Attorneys for Plailntiff
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